We characterize the Theil ordering of income inequality by means of a few ordinal axioms.
reasonable, it may not be reliable. Discarding indices based on intuition is not the best scientific practice. The same way there are optical illusions that induce us to believe that one object is longer than another one while they are in fact of equal length, so there might be "optical illusions" that induce us to believe that one income distribution is more unequal than another one, while in fact their lever of inequality is the same.
Another, more cautious way to evaluate inequality measures is to evaluate their properties at a more abstract level. We may make a list of properties we think a reasonable inequality measure should satisfy and check which inequality measures actually satisfy them. This method allows us to compare different indices in terms of the differential properties they do and do not satisfy. This method has been successfully applied in the characterization of the (family of) Gini index, the Theil indices, the family of entropy indices, etc.
Some properties of inequality indices are uncontroversial. In fact, they are so uncontroversial that they are considered as defining properties of the bare concept of inequality measure. For example, the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which postulates that the transfer of income from a rich individual to a poorer one increases inequality as long as the poor individual does not become richer than the rich one, is considered by Fields and Fey [3] as one of the basic axioms of inequality measurement. Other axioms are less uncontroversial, though. For example, some of them require from an inequality index that it be decomposable in some particular way. Specifically, given any partition of a society into two subsocieties, the overall inequality should be decomposable into an inequality between the subsocieties, and the inequality within them. Although very convenient, this decomposability is definitely not an essential property of an inequality index.
This axiomatic approach has been successfully applied by Bourguignon [2] , Foster [4] , Shorrocks [7] and many others. In particular, Foster [4] has shown that the Theil index of income inequality is the only index that satisfies the three basic properties enumerated by Fields and Fey [3] , as well as a simple decomposability property.
There is a distinction between properties that we believe to be important. Some axioms are ordinal in nature, and others are cardinal. Ordinal axioms impose restrictions on the way different income distributions are ranked. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers is an ordinal property in that compares two particular distributions and tells us which one is more unequal. It does not tell us anything about the magnitude of the inequality. Cardinal axioms, on the other hand, impose restrictions on the functional form that is used to measure inequality. The decomposability property that both Bourguignon [2] and Foster [4] use to characterize the Theil index is cardinal.
Indeed, it requires that the total inequality of a distribution be a weighted sum of the inequalities of its regions and the inequality between these regions.
In this paper we characterize the Theil inequality measure by means of ordinal axioms only. In particular, we strip the decomposability property used by Bourguignon [2] Foster [4] from all its cardinal content, and maintain its ordinal content only.
Related Literature
Talk of characterizations of the Gini index, the entropy indices, the Atkinson indices, etc.
The Theil index has been introduced by Theil [8] . Theil [8, 9] shows that this index has the following useful property, which, following Foster [4] we call Theil-Decomposability. Partition a society into two groups of income earners. We can define its within-group inequality as the weighted average of the income inequality levels of the two groups, where the weights are the income shares of each group. We can also define the between-group inequality as the inequality level of the original society after smoothing the income of each group. That is, between-group inequality is the inequality that would result if there was no within-group inequality. It turns out that no matter the partition of the original society, Theil's index measures its income inequality as the sum of the within-group and between-group inequalities.
Bourguignon [2] used this decomposability property to axiomatically characterize the Theil index. In particular, he shows that it is the only twice differentiable index that satisfies various uncontroversial axioms (Symmetry, Directness, Homogeneity, Replication Invariance) and TheilDecomposability. Foster [4] shows that the cardinal requirement of twice differentiability can be replaced by the ordinal one of continuity.
In this paper we show, albeit on a larger class of societies, that the cardinal axiom of TheilDecomposability can be replaced by three weaker ordinal axioms.
Our proof is very different from those of Bourguignon [2] and Foster [4] . Bourguignon heavily relies on the twice differentiability of the index. Foster relies on Lee's [6] theorem to show that a particular simple function based on an index that satisfies Theil decomposability (and other uncontroversial axioms) is a multiple of Shannon's measure of entropy. 1 We rely on a well-known characterization of the logarithms to show that an index that satisfies our axioms, restricted to particularly simple societies, is in fact a logarithmic function. 2 While Foster's proof consists mainly of showing that a Theil-Decomposable index must be a multiple of Theil's measure, the most burdensome part of our proof is that an inequality ordering that satisfies our axioms can be represented by a Theil-Decomposable index. Once this is done, showing that this index is in fact Theil's measure is less difficult. 3 Our result is reminiscent to Frankel and Volij [5] characterization of the Mutual Information measure of segregation. The main difference is that Frankel and Volij, due to an extensive use of an axiom of symmetry among different ethnic groups and one of invariance to splitting of groups, are able to prove their result without resorting to decomposability. In our case, since there are no multiplicity of groups, we have to add the decomposability axiom. Indeed, in Section ??
show that there are inequality indices that satisfy all our axioms except for decomposability.
Definitions
A society is a collection (n 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (n K , y K ) where y k , k = 1, . . . , K are income levels, not all of them 0, and for each k, n k > 0 is the mass of people with income level y k . Elements (n k , y k ) of a society are called social classes.
For a society S = (n 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (n K , y K ) , we denote by |S|, the total level of income in S, and by n(S) its total population. That is,
Note that |S| > 0 and n(S) > 0.
For a society S = (n 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (n K , y K ) , and α > 0, αS denotes the society that is obtained from S by multiplying the number of people in each social class by α. That is, αS = 1 This simple function is the value of the index applied to a two-person society, one person earning a proportion t of the total income and the other one the remaining 1 − t.
2 These simple societies are ones where a proportion 1 − t of the population has no income at all and the remaining complementary proportion shares all society's income evenly.
(αn 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (αn K , y K ) .
For any two societies S 1 and S 2 , S 1 ∪ S 2 denotes the union of the two.
We denote by S n , the set of all societies with population mass n, and by S = ∪ n>0 S n the set of all societies.
An inequality ordering is a binary relation on S. Some orderings can be represented by an inequality index. An inequality index is a function I : S →R that assigns to each society a real number, that represents the society's inequality level.
Examples of inequality indices
Example 1 The Theil index, T : S → R, is defined as follows:
The Theil ordering is the ordering represented by the Theil index.
Note that the Theil index can be written as
or as the difference between the maximum entropy in a population of mass n, and the entropy of the society.
, is defined as follows:
The Gini ordering is the ordering represented by the Gini index. 
The Atkinson ordering is the ordering represented by the Atkinson index.
Example 4
The Second Theil index, T 0 : S + → [0, ∞),is defined as follows:
The Second Theil ordering is the ordering represented by the Second Theil index.
Researchers are sometimes interested in decomposable inequality indices. Decomposable indices allow us to attribute total inequality to different factors. In particular, decomposable indices allow us to decompose total inequality into inequality between subsocieties and inequality within subsocieties. One general way to define decomposability is as follows.
Definition 5
We say that inequality index I is decomposable if for any two societies S 1 and S 2 ,
where S i = n(S i ),
, and f is homogeneous of degree one in both its arguments.
Note that decomposability is a cardinal axiom.
Foster [4] used a more restrictive version of decomposability in his characterization of the Theil index.
Definition 6
We say that inequality index I is Theil-decomposable, if for any two societies S 1 and S 2 ,
Although Theil decomposability is a cardinal axiom, it has very strong ordinal implications. In this paper we identify some of these ordinal implications and, together with other ordinal axioms, use them to characterize the Theil income inequality ordering.
Axioms
We now present a set of axioms that an inequality ordering may satisfy. The first axioms embodies the idea that we are interested in relative measures of income inequality.
Definition 7 (HOM)
We say that satisfies Homogeneity if for all (n 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (n K , y K ) in S, and for all α > 0, we have (
Homogeneity states that only the relative distribution of income determines inequality. In other words, one does not need to know the units in which income is measured (dollars, euros, etc.) to determine whether one society has a more or less equal distribution than another one.
The next axiom is similar to homogeneity in the sense that it is not the absolute number of people who has any given income level what matters, but their proportion in the population.
Definition 8 (RI)
We say that satisfies replication invariance if for all (n 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (n K , y K )
in S, and for all α > 0, we have (
Replication invariance, which is sometimes called Dalton's principle of population, states that if we replicate a society by multiplying each individual by a fixed constant then inequality remains unaffected.
The previous two axioms state that some particular changes in the society do not affect its income inequality. The next axiom, on the other hand, states that some other changes do affect income inequality in a certain way.
Definition 9 (TP)
We say that satisfies the transfer principle if for all egalitarian societies (n, y) , and for all (n 1 , y 1 ) , (n 2 , y 2 ) such that n 1 + n 2 = n and ny = n 1 y 1 + n 2 y 2 we have Definition 10 (SCDP) We say that satisfies social class division property if whenever S is obtained from S by means of a subdivision of a social class (n k , y k ) ∈ S into two social classes The next axiom is an ordinal implication of the decomposability axiom used in Foster's [4] characterization of the Theil index.
Definition 11 (IND) We say that satisfies Independence, if for all S 1 , S 2 ∈ S such that |S 1 | = |S 2 | and n(S 1 ) = n(S 2 ), and for all societies S ∈ S,
Independence says that if a given society is composed of two regions or subsocieties, and one of its regions' income becomes more unequally distributed, then the income distribution of the whole society becomes more unequal as well.
Claim 12 If the inequality order satisfies Independence, and the transfer principle, then it also satisfies the social class division property.
Proof. Let S = (n 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (n K , y K ) be a society and let
be the society that is obtained from S by means of a subdivision of a social class (
By independence,
The next axiom is another ordinal implication of Theil-decomposability.
Definition 13 (DEC)
We say that satisfies Decomposability, if for all four societies S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 ∈ S, such that
• |S 1 | = |S 2 |, and
• |S 3 | = |S 4 |, and n(S 3 ) = n(S 4 ),
we have
Decomposability states the following. Suppose that a given society (S 1 ∪ S 3 ) is composed of two subsocieties and that the population of one of these subsocieties, S 1 , changes (without changing its total income), resulting in the society (S 2 ∪ S 3 ). This population change obviously may affect the inequality of the whole society's income distribution in that the society's income might become either more or less equally distributed. Decomposability requires that this effect be independent of the distribution of income of the subsociety whose population remained unchanged.
The last axiom is a technical continuity requirement. It states that "similar" societies have "similar" levels of income inequality.
Definition 14
The inequality ordering satisfies Continuity if for all three societies S, S and S , the sets
are closed.
Properties of The Theil Inequality Ordering
Claim 15 The Theil ordering satisfies replication invariance and homogeneity.
Proof. Left to the reader.
Claim 16
The Theil ordering satisfies Independence.
Proof. Let S 1 = (n 1 , x 1 ) , . . . , (n K 1 , x K 1 ) and S 2 = (m 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (m K 2 , y K 2 ) be two societies such that |S 1 | = |S 2 | and n(S 1 ) = n(S 2 ) = n, and let S = (p 1 , z 1 ) , . . . , (p K 3 , z K 3 ) ∈ S. Then,
Since the Theil ordering satisfies homogeneity, we can assume without loss of generality that |S 1 ∪ S| = |S 2 ∪ S| = 1.
Claim 17 The Theil ordering satisfies Decomposability. w 1 ) , . . . , (t K 2 , w K 2 ) ∈ S, and
can be assumed to be equal 1.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 18 There is a unique inequality ordering defined on S that satisfies, homogeneity, replication invariance, independence, decomposability, the transfer principle, and continuity. It is the Theil inequality ordering.
Proof of the main theorem
Let S 0 = (1, 1) be the society with population mass 1 and a uniformly distributed income of one.
For each α ∈ (0, 1), let S α = (α, 0), (1 − α, 1/(1 − α) be the society with population mass 1, in which a proportion α of the population has income 0, and a proportion 1 − α of the population has income 1/(1 − α). Note that for all α, S α has population 1 and income 1.
Lemma 19 For each society S ∈ S, there is α ∈ (0, 1) such that S α S.
Proof. Let S ∈ S. By RI we can assume that S has a population mass of 1. By homogeneity we can assume without loss of generality that the maximum level of income in S is 1: max{y k :
Denote S the society that is obtained from S by subdividing each social class (n k , y k ) in S into two sub-classes (n k (1 − y k ), 0), (n k y k , 1) . By SCDP, S S. By SCDP again,
Therefore α = 1 − |S| is the number we are looking for.
Lemma 20 All societies where total income is uniformly distributed have the same degree of income inequality. Further for all societies S ∈ S, S S 0 .
Proof. Let S be a society with uniformly distributed income. By HOM, RI, and SCDP, S ∼ S 0 .
Let now S = (n 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (n K , y K ) ∈ S be an arbitrary society. Let S k be the society that results from combining social classes 1 to k, into one social class
But S K has only one social class, and hence income is uniformly distributed there.
Proof.
Lemma 22 Let a ∈ (0, 1) be such that S a S 0 . Then, for 0 ≤ α < β < 1,
Proof. By SCDP applied three times,
Lemma 23 Let a ∈ (0, 1) be such that S a S 0 . For any society S ∈ S such that S a S S 0 , there is a unique α ∈ [0, 1] such that
Proof. By C, the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : αS a ∪ (1 − α)S 0 S} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : S αS a ∪ (1 − α)S 0 } are closed. Since S a S S 0 , they are not empty. Since is complete, their union is [0, 1].
Therefore, since the unit interval is connected, the intersection of the two sets is not empty. By
Lemma 22, this intersection must contain a single element. This single element is the α we are looking for.
Let S be a society and let a ∈ (1/2, 1) such that S a S and S a S 0 . By Lemmas 19 and 21
such a exists. Then we have S a S S 0 . Let α(a) be the unique number identified in Lemma 23 that satisfies
Similarly, since S a S 1/2 S 0 , let β(a) the unique number that satisfies
By Lemma 22 β(a) > 0. Therefore, we can define an index r(S) to be the ratio
Claim 24
The ratio r(S) is well-defined. Namely, it does not depend on the choice of a.
Proof. Let a, b ∈ (1/2, 1) such that S a S and S b S. Let α(a) and β(a) be defined by
and
By Lemma 23 such numbers exist. Similarly define α(b) and β(b) to satisfy
Assume without loss of generality that a > b. Then S a S b . Let γ be defined by
By Lemma 23 such γ exists. Therefore, it follows from (3) using replication invariance and independence, and then by SCDP,
Comparing with (1), we obtain α(a) = α(b)γ. Similarly,
Comparing with (2), we obtain β(a) = β(b)γ. Note that by Lemma 22 β(a), β(b), γ > 0. As a result we get
Lemma 25
The ratio r represents the inequality order .
Proof. Let S and S be two societies and assume S S. Let a ∈ (1/2, 1) such that S a S . By
Lemma 19 this can be done. Let α and β be defined by
Then, by Lemma 22 α ≤ β. Letting β(a) be defined by
we obtain
Proposition 26 Let S and S be two societies. Then
Proof. Let S and S be two societies, with populations n and m, respectively. By RI and HOM, we can assume without loss of generality that n + m = 1, and |S ∪ S | = 1. Let a ∈ (1/2, 1) be such that S a S, S a S , and S a S ∪ S . By Lemmas 19 and 21 this can be done. Let γ be defined by
Similarly, let α be defined by
It is enough to show that
We first show the following technical lemma.
Lemma 27 γ ≤ 1 − |S| α.
Proof. Denote S * a = n (a, 0), (1 − a,
|S|
(1−a)n ) and S * 0 = (n, |S| n ) . Note that these two societies have a population n and an income |S|. That is, they have the same population and income as S.
They are obtained, respectively, by multiplying the population and incomes of S a and S 0 by n and |S| /n. Therefore, by homogeneity and replication invariance, it follows from (6) that
Since S a S ∪ S ,
by RI and SCDP.
ability and replace αS * a in both sides of the above expression by αS * 0 (both αS * a and αS * 0 have the same population and income), and obtain
Consequently, by Lemma 22, 1 − α|S| ≥ γ.
Now we are ready to show that (7) holds. Since γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists k ∈ N such that
Therefore,
and by IND (S and αS * a ∪ (1 − α)S * 0 have the same population and income),
by HOM and RI which, by SCDP, is equivalent to
Note that this society is well defined since, by Lemma 27, (1 − γ) − α |S| ≥ 0. Therefore,
By IND (S ∪ S and (α |S| + γ)S a ∪ ((1 − γ) − α |S|)S 0 have the same population and income),
Proof. Left to the reader. 
Also, h(1/2) = r(1/2) = 1.
We will now show that h(pq) = h(p) + h(q) for all p, q ∈ (0, 1].
To see this, note that Proposition 30 The index r is the Theil index.
Proof. Let S = (n 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (n K , y K ) ∈ S be a society. We need to show that r(S) = T (S). If K = 1, the result is obvious. So assume K ≥ 2. By RI we can assume without loss of generality that n (S) = 1. Similarly, by homogeneity we can assume without loss of generality that y k = 1.
Therefore |S| 2 < |S| = n k y k < 1. Also, y k |S| < 1 for k = 1, . . . K. Define
That is, S K is the result of replacing social classes (n k , y k ) , k = 1, . . . , K, in S by (n k (1 − y k |S|)), 0) , n k y k |S|, n k y k |S| r (n k (1 − y k |S|), 0) , n k y k |S|, 1 |S| .
Note that by RI, and homogeneity,
Also,
